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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1871 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW KOSHY CHACKO, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES, 
                                   Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A090-590-908) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 11, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Matthew Koshy Chacko petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Chacko entered the United States in 1981 as a visitor and became a permanent 
resident in 1989.  In 2007, he was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a forged 
instrument in New York and was sentenced to one and one-half to three years in prison.  
In September 2010, he was charged as removable as an aggravated felon.  Represented by 
counsel, he did not file any applications for relief from removal.   In June 2011, Chacko 
filed a post-conviction petition in the state court in New York.  He argued that he had not 
been advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  In October 2011, the IJ 
found Chacko removable, denied his request for a continuance, and ordered Chacko 
removed to India.  In March 2012, the BIA dismissed his pro se appeal, and Chacko filed 
a pro se petition for review.  After Chacko filed a pro se opening brief, counsel made an 
appearance and filed a reply brief.  The Government has filed a motion to dismiss. 
 Chacko does not dispute that his conviction is an aggravated felony.  Instead, he 
seeks to challenge the validity of his conviction.  However, his conviction is final for 
immigration purposes until it is overturned.  Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Because Chacko is an aggravated felon, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
denial of his claims for relief except to the extent he raises legal and constitutional 
claims.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C)&(D). 
 Chacko argues that he was denied due process when the IJ denied his motion for a 
continuance.  Before the BIA, Chacko argued that by denying a continuance, the IJ 
denied his due process rights to prepare for his removal hearing and acquire evidence of 
post-conviction relief to challenge his removability.  We exercise de novo review of 
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procedural due process claims.  Chacko was entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claim 
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence.  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 
(3d Cir. 2006).  The IJ concluded that Chacko had not shown good cause for a 
continuance.  At the hearing in October 2011, the IJ noted that Chacko had been before 
the IJ since June 2011 and time had been granted for him for find an attorney and obtain 
his conviction records.  Time was then granted for Chacko to object to his conviction 
records and to decide whether he wanted to file for relief from removal.  The IJ 
concluded that post-conviction relief was both collateral and speculative.  On appeal, the 
BIA agreed.  The IJ’s denial of Chacko’s request for a continuance did not deny him due 
process.  Chacko has not shown that he was denied a fair hearing or a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence.
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 Chacko also contends that he was denied his due process rights because he was 
denied visits by his immigration attorney while he was before the IJ, denied access to the 
law library while in jail, and put in solitary confinement at the time his brief to the BIA 
was due.  His attorneys did not raise any issues related to their ability to meet with 
Chacko before the IJ.  As for his claim that he was denied access to the law library and 
put in solitary confinement, we note that the BIA granted Chacko an extension of time to 
                                              
1
 Chacko also argues that the transcript for a hearing on July 14, 2011, is missing from 
the record.  However, he does not describe what took place at that hearing such that the 
absence of the transcript prevented him from having a fair hearing.  In his brief before the 
BIA, he stated that on July 14, 2011, the Government submitted additional documents 
and the IJ continued the hearing to allow Chacko’s attorneys to review the documents.  
A.R. at 12. 
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file his brief based on these allegations.
2
  After his second request for an extension was 
denied, Chacko did not raise these issues in his brief before the BIA.  A.R. at 10-16; Pet. 
for review at 6.  Because these arguments were not presented to the BIA, they are 
unexhausted.  We lack jurisdiction to review unexhausted arguments.  Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).       
 In his counseled reply brief, Chacko argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), makes post-conviction motions ancillary to 
removal proceedings and not collateral.  He argues that the BIA’s policies and procedures 
for evaluating continuances for ancillary proceedings, such as pending visa petitions and 
adjustment of status applications, should apply to continuances for post-conviction 
collateral relief.  These arguments were also not presented to the BIA.  As discussed 
above, we lack jurisdiction to review unexhausted arguments.   
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  The Government’s 
motion to dismiss is denied.  The Government’s motion to supplement the record is 
denied. 
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  The BIA noted that it generally does not grant more than one extension and Chacko 
should assume he would not receive another extension.  A.R. at 61.  The BIA denied his 
subsequent request for another extension of time because he had not shown extraordinary 
circumstances.  A.R. at 54. 
